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NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

MANDAMUS AND APPELLATE REVIEW-FORMULATING
SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR OBTAINING THE WRIT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The orderly progression of litigation in federal courts is accomplished
through the use of procedural orders issued pursuant to either the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or specific acts of Congress. Since a decision
affecting procedure rarely touches the merits of a case, a party injured
thereby is faced with a problem in obtaining review. The litigant must
either qualify for one of the limited types of interlocutory review2 or
await final judgment and take an appeal.' If forced to do the latter, there
is always the possibility that ultimate success on the merits will eliminate
the need for appeal, or that the procedural injury will lose importance in
the context of other appealable issues.
1. Statutory authority for procedural orders is embodied in title 28 of the United States
Code. See note 2 infra.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). This section reads as follows:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts. . . or of the judges thereof, granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions ....
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers ....
(3) Interlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to
admiralty cases ..
(4) Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement ....

Id.
In addition to interlocutory appeal of right, Congress has provided for discretionary
interlocutory review:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal from such order ....
Id. § 1292(b).
The availability of these types of interlocutory review becomes an important consideration in determining the likelihood of receiving a writ of mandamus. See notes 76-83
infra and accompanying text. For further discussion of interlocutory appeals, see Note,
Appealability in the FederalCourts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 367-75, 378-82 (1961).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). This section provides: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
The scope of the "final decision" test is still uncertain. See Crick, The Final Judgment
as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932). The Supreme Court admits that the
problem is still a confusing one. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71
(1974).
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A partial solution to the litigant's dilemma is the availability of a writ
of mandamus. 4 Use of the writ, however, is severely limited. The courts
are required to effectuate an overwhelming congressional policy against
piecemeal litigation 5 while, at the same time, avoiding irreparable injury
to litigants. 6 In order to achieve this balance, the writ is used only in

"exceptional circumstances," and therefore courts commonly refer to
7
mandamus as an "extraordinary writ."
Although Congress enacted the All Writs Statute, 8 courts have traditionally struggled in their attempts to more specifically define the parameters of when mandamus is properly employed. In so doing, the Supreme
Court has set forth basic policies that direct lower appellate courts to use
the writ sparingly in order to preserve the forcefulness that Congress
intended it to have. It has been left to the individual circuits, however, to
specifically delineate criteria which, once satisfied, will persuade the
courts that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy in a given
instance.
The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed its previous decisions regarding
mandamus and, in Bauman v. United States DistrictCourt,9 concluded
that issuance of the writ will depend upon the analysis of five factors.' 0
While recognizing a need for specific guidelines," the court noted that
guidelines are, at most, a helpful starting point and that "[t]he considerations are cumulative and proper disposition will require a balancing of
conflicting indicators." 12 It is clear from the variety of circumstances in
4. Appellate courts derive their power to issue the writ from the All Writs Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970): "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The statute also authorizes
writs other than mandamus (such as prohibition and certiorari).
5. This policy is inherent in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) and is given tremendous force by
the courts. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953); Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25, 30 (1943); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325-26 (1940).
6. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953); Exparte Fahey, 332
U.S. 258, 260 (1947); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29-30 (1926).
7. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383-85 (1953); Exparte Fahey,
332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
9. 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. Id.at 654.
11. Id. at 653.
12. Id. at 655. The problems that can occur from rote application of the guidelines are
that: (I) the prescribed situations will be present in varying degrees (i.e., differing degrees
of error or injury), and (2) application of each guideline may result in differing conclusions. This calls for a balancing approach in order to enable the court to reach a final
decision on issuance of the writ. Id.
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which mandamus is arguably available that the court must still consider
the propriety of the writ on an individual basis.13
II.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A.

Traditional View

Since all guidelines provided by the circuit courts must fit into the
framework of policy enunciated by the Supreme Court, an overview of
the Court's decisions is necessary to an understanding of the more
specific criteria. Early decisions were clear in expressing the Court's

distaste for review by mandamus.1 4 Few guidelines were given to describe when the writ would be appropriate. Instead, it was more common
for the Court to affirm the lower courts' denials of the writ by simply
stating that the cases did not involve the type of exceptional circumstances normally warranting mandamus. 15 Although the Court suggested

that appellate courts do have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, 16 it
put the onus of discretionary use on the appellate judges. 17 The exercise
of that discretion was generally reserved for times when the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction or power. 18 The test was not merely whether the
order was erroneous, 19 since mandamus is not a substitute for appeal.2"
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
15. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
16. In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943), the Supreme Court
essentially concluded that the appellate court was entitled to hear the case on the basis of
".prospective" jurisdiction: "Its [the appellate court's] authority is not confined to the
issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but extends to those
cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected."
Id. at 26. Since the court would have jurisdiction over any appeal that is filed, it has
jurisdiction prior to appeal to insure that the district court does not take action which
would frustrate an appeal and negate the possibility of review. See McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268 (1910); Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. 258 (1872).
17. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1955); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1943).
18. In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) the Court stated:
The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction. . . has been to confine
an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. Even in such cases appellate courts
are reluctant to interfere with the decision of a lower court on jurisdictional questions
which it is competent to decide . . ..
Id. at 26. See also De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217
(1945).
19. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
20. Id.; Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
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Rather, the writ was appropriate only "where there is clear abuse of
discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power.' "21 For example, issuance of
the writ was proper where the trial judge erroneously stayed the proceedings before him pending disposition of the same cause of action in a state
court.2" The Court found this to be an abdication of authority and
jurisdiction by the trial judge.2 3 The abuse of discretion test sharply
restricted the scope of review available through mandamus due to the
difficulty in satisfying the initial burden.
Another problem recognized by the Court as reason for inhibiting the
use of mandamus is that, where the writ is sought, the trial judge is made
25
a party to the action. 24 The judge becomes the respondent to the petition
and, thereby, he is forced into a position of partiality.2 6 A writ, therefore,
takes on a more personal tone than does an ordinary appeal, since the
former is issued directly to the trial judge. 27 Although this does not
totally dispense with the writ as a viable remedy, 28 appellate courts
recognize this factor as an issue in determining the propriety of mandamus.29
B. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus
By its decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. ,30 the Supreme Court
21. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
22. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
23. Id. at 281.
24. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
25. The judge is "obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of
the litigants before him." Id.
26. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965) is a rare example where the judge,
by employing the counsel of one of the litigants to aid him in answering the petition, was
later disqualified from proceeding with the case. As suggested by some commentators,
this problem has been somewhat alleviated by rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which allows the judge not to appear on the petition, without inferring any
admission of error. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3932, at 211-12 (1977).
27. Court opinions do not address themselves directly to this issue but the attitudes of
the judges involved can be assessed through inferences within the decisions. See generally
Carrington, The Power of DistrictJudges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3
GA. L. REV. 507, 512-13 (1969); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts,
41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 771-78 (1957).
28. But cf. Bell, The FederalAppellate Courts and the All Writs Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 858,
862 (1969) ("[Clonfrontation is still cited as the principal reason for denial of mandamus.").
29. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has
apparently resolved this problem by recognizing that the parties to the litigation are the
appropriate individuals to present the issues on the petition. See Hartland v. Alaska
Airlines, 544 F.2d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 1976). The court continues, however, to acknowledge that there is still concern over the district judge's role during mandamus proceedings.
See Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 653 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1977).
30. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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made the courts of appeals more accessible to litigants seeking writs of

mandamus. La Buy involved the practice by a district court judge of
continually referring complex lawsuits to masters. 3 After numerous
reversals on appeal, the judge continued to refer cases with seeming

disregard of the prerequisite that exceptional circumstances exist. After
dispensing with any doubts as to an appellate court's power to issue the

writ,32 the Court introduced the type of mandamus most commonly
invoked today, known as "supervisory" 33 mandamus. Limited to review
of the trial court's application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,34
"supervisory" mandamus is proper to vacate an order issued thereunder
"to prevent.

. .

action.

. .

so palpably improper as to place it beyond

35
the scope of the rule invoked."
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated by the
Supreme Court,36 appellate supervision of the district courts is necessary
to insure their proper application.37 In order to fit supervisory mandamus

into the existing framework of limitations on the use of the writ, La Buy

restricted its use to situations involving repeated error by the district
judge. 38 "Repetition" provided the necessary exceptional circumstance
and indicated that review by appeal was inadequate to correct the trial
judge's errors.

A further step toward defining when mandamus would be proper was
taken in Schlagenhauf v. Holder.39 In this case, the Court developed the
31. The trial judge made the references pursuant to rule 53(b), which provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried
by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions
to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of
damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional

condition requires it.

FED. R. CIv. P. 53(b).
32. 352 U.S. at 254-55. The Court reaffirmed the prospective jurisdiction approach
taken in Roche and introduced the term "naked power," which is used in subsequent
opinions to summarily dispense with the power issue.
33. Id. at 259. For further discussion of supervisory mandamus, see Note, Supervisory
and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus].
34. The Court made special note of the fact that the order in La Buy involved a federal
rule while previous mandamus actions usually involved procedural orders issued pursuant
to statutory authority. 352 U.S. at 257.
35. Id. at 256.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970); id. § 2072 (Supp. V 1975).
37. 352 U.S. at 259-60.
38. The Court stated that "there is an end of patience and it clearly appears that the
Court of Appeals has for years admonished the trial judges [not to overuse the reference
procedure]." Id. at 258.
39. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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concept of "advisory" mandamus. 4' Again limited to violation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,41 the writ could be used to review
orders that required application of new rules where there was no clear

existing interpretation for the trial judge to follow.42 Schlagenhauf was
concerned with whether rule

3543

required a defendant in a civil trial to

submit to a physical examination. This aspect of the rule had never been
considered by the appellate courts.' It was held that once the issue is
properly before the court of appeals, 45 the court has a duty to instruct the
district judge on the proper scope of the rule. 46 Advisory mandamus has
limited use, however, in that once invoked to obtain higher court interpretation, it can no longer be used regarding that particular aspect of
the rule. 47 The remedy for the trial judge's failure to follow the instructions of the appellate court remains appeal. Writ of mandamus does not
attach as the appropriate remedy for subsequent misapplications of the
federal rule.48

Both La Buy and Schlagenhauf have, by devising new terminology,
expanded the situations in which mandamus can appropriately be applied. They move from the earlier "confining jurisdiction" 49 approach to
a broader supervision theory. 50 However, appellate courts must carefully
exercise their discretion 5' and avoid overly broad interpretations of these
40. But see Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 33, at 612-13 (asserting
that advisory mandamus is a normal outgrowth of supervisory mandamus and not a new
concept developed in Schlagenhauf).
41. 379 U.S. at 112.
42. Id.at 110.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
44. 379 U.S. at 110.
45. In Schlagenhauf the Court remarked that
the petition was properly before the court on a substantial allegation of usurpation of
power in ordering any examination of a defendant, an issue of first impression that
called for the construction and application of Rule 35 in a new context. . . . [Tihe
Court of Appeals should have also . . . determined [the scope of the rule] to settle
new and important problems.
Id. at I11.
46. The scope was the issue of "good cause" and whether it was a prerequisite to a
physical examination of the defendant once it was determined that rule 35 was applicable
to defendants. Id.
47. Id. at 112.
48. Id. See also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3934,
at 232 (1977).
49. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943). See note 18 supra.
50. The standard of confining the lower court to its prescribed jurisdiction is increasingly referred to as the "traditional use of the writ." 379 U.S. at 109-10. This has led some
commentators to believe that La Buy and Schlagenhauf grant a separate basis for the
writ. See, e.g., Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 33, at 607,
51. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. at 111-12; La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. at 255-60.
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Supreme Court decisions. The earlier language of "extreme circumstances" remains as the standard by which appellate judges are guided. 5"
C. Recent Decisions
Some

commentators5 3

believe that the later Supreme Court decisions

have retreated from the more expansive policy developed in La Buy and
Schlagenhauf. In Will v. United States,54 the defendant in a tax evasion
prosecution filed a motion for a bill of particulars to obtain certain
information from the Government. Upon the Government's refusal to

supply the requested information, the district judge indicated his intention to dismiss the case if the Government persisted in its failure to
disclose. The Government sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
district judge to strike the order for the bill of particulars. After initially
denying the writ, the Seventh Circuit altered its decision and issued the

writ. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that mandamus is a "drastic
remedy" 55 and "among the most potent weapons in the judicial
arsenal."'56

The Will Court, however, did reaffirm the use of supervisory and
advisory mandamus by stressing their value in instructing trial court
judges. 57 Since the court of appeals involved in Will had done nothing
more than issue the writ, 58 it had not satisfied the educational purposes5 9
expressed in La Buy and Schlagenhauf. The factual circumstances
presented in Will were equally important to the restrictive nature of the
52. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. at 257.
53. See, e.g., 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.28 (2d ed. 1977).
54. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
55. Id. at 104.
56. Id.at 107.
57. Id.at 104-07.
58. The Supreme Court stated:
Mandamus is not a punitive remedy. The entire thrust of the Government's justification for mandamus in this case, moreover, is that the writ serves a vital corrective and
didactic function. While these aims lay at the core of this Court's decisions in La Buy
and Schlagenhauf. . .we fail to see how they can be served here without findings of
fact by the issuing court and some statement of the court's legal reasoning. A
mandamus from the blue without rationale is tantamount to an abdication of the very
expository and supervisory functions of an appellate court upon which the Government rests its attempt to justify the action below.
Id.at 107 (citation omitted).
59. Due to the extraordinary nature of mandamus, the issuing court must justify its
decision to issue the writ with a well-reasoned opinion. This serves two functions: (1) to
assure that the Supreme Court is in a position to conduct an "informed review" of the
circuit court decision, if necessary, and (2) to provide the district court with the proper
interpretation and scope of the rule which it had erroneously applied. Id. at 105-07.
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decision, as noted by the Court itselff6 and several commentators.6 The
trial was a criminal prosecution and it was the Government which sought
the writ. The case, therefore, raised substantial issues regarding the
availability of appeal by the prosecution in a criminal setting. 62 Although
many courts, including the Supreme Court,6 3 have cited Will as applicable to cases arising in the context of civil proceedings, its usefulness must
64
be considered in light of the particular facts presented therein.
The Court's most recent decision, Kerr v. United States District
Court,65 re-emphasizes the extraordinary quality and restrictive use of
mandamus. It stresses the basic congressional policy against piecemeal
litigation, 66 a. the Court had stressed in previous decisions. 67 In addition,
the Court reviewed its prior decisions and devised a general framework
within which the appellate courts may exercise their power:
As a means of implementing the rule that the writ will issue only in
extraordinary circumstances, we have set forth various conditions
for its issuance. Among these are that the party seeking issuance of
the writ have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,
• * . and that he satisfy "the burden of showing that [his] right to
issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable. . . .' "Moreover, it
is important to remember that issuance of the writ is in large part a
matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is ad68
dressed.
The decision in Kerr illustrates that the Supreme Court, with increasing
frequency, is willing to give more specific guidelines to the circuit
courts. It stresses the factors that the Court views as the most important in
determining when mandamus is proper. However, Kerr still leaves
appellate judges with vast discretion in deciding whether the writ will
69
issue.
60. 389 U.S. at 96, 100 n.10.
61. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE q 110.28, at 308 (2d ed. 1977); Supervisory and
Advisory Mandamus, supra note 33, at 620. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has taken this
view. See note 64 infra.
62. 389 U.S. at 96.
63. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
64. Lampman v. United States Dist. Court, 418 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.

denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 (9th
Cir. 1968). But see Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 511 F.2d 192, 196 (9th Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976) (citing Will as authority in the context of a civil proceeding).
65. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
66. Id. at 403.
67. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.

68. 426 U.S. at 403 (citations omitted).
69. Id. See also Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (mandamus proper to correct district court's habit of remanding cases properly removed).
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Ill.

THE NINTH CIRCUrr

The Ninth Circuit has attempted to develop practical guidelines for

mandamus and, at the same time, to incorporate the policies enunciated
by the Supreme Court. In a recent decision, Bauman v. United States
District Court,70 the court listed the following factors as recurring in
many of its prior opinions:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as
a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. .

.

. (2) The

petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on
appeal. (This guideline is closely related to the first.). . . . (3) The
district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. . . . (4)

The district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests
persistent disregard of the federal rules. .

.

. (5) The district court's

order raises71new and important problems or issues of law of first
impression.
The apparent simplicity of these criteria, on its face, creates an illusion
that the court has finally stated the law in such a way as to afford easy
application. 72 But, as the Ninth Circuit recognizes, "these guidelines
• . . do not always result in bright-line'distinctions. " 73 A policy that the
person seeking the writ has the burden of showing a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ 74 has been incorporated into these factors; the
75
petitioner is required to prove each factor clearly and indisputably.
Each factor carries with it, however, different weight depending entirely
on the circumstances to which it is applied. Therefore, the circuit court is
still forced to employ a balancing approach in order to reach a final
decision.
IV. THE BAUMAN FACTORS
A. The PartySeeking the Writ Has No Other Adequate Means, Such
as a Direct Appeal, to Attain the Relief He or She Desires
Following the policy that mandamus is not a substitute for appeal, 76 the
writ will not issue when there are other avenues of interlocutory appeal
70. 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
72. See generally notes 126-62 infra and accompanying text.
73. 557 F.2d at 655.
74. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Will v. United States,
389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953).
75. See Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 692 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 109 (1977).
76. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
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available.7 7 Statutory provisions 7 for interlocutory appeal and judicially
created exceptions 79 to the final judgment rule are included in the court's
assessment, thereby creating a variety of alternative remedies.
In satisfying his burden, the petitioner must prove, that he has exhausted all of these other remedies.80 This includes having been denied
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), 8' refused entry of
final judgment under federal rule 54(b),82 and denied appeal under the
collateral order doctrine.8 3

The Ninth Circuit has made it easier for a petitioner to know at the
outset what alternatives are available. There are certain orders for which
77. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Bauman v. United
States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 655-56 (9th Cir. 1977); Arthur Young & Co. v. United
States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 691-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 109 (1977); Belfer
v. Pence, 435 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1970); CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.
1961).
78. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970). See note 2 supra.
79. The most well known exception is the "collateral order" doctrine developed in
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A "collateral order" is one
which falls within "that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that the consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546. These orders are deemed final
and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
Although the Ninth Circuit has granted mandamus partially based on the fact that
review under the Cohen exception was not yet established as a "right," Pacific Car &
Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 n.8 (9th Cir. 1968), the trend seems to be away
from mandamus when Cohen may be applicable. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court,
557 F.2d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of Cohen and the application of
the "collateral order" doctrine, see 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.10, at 130-37 (2d
ed. 1977); Underwood, Appeals in the FederalPracticefrom CollateralOrders, 36 VA. L.
REV. 731 (1950); Note, Appealability in the FederalCourts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1961).
80. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 692 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 109 (1977).
81. Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Lydick, 459 F.2d 959, 960 (9th Cir. 1972). See 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1970). If certification is denied, writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the
district judge to certify the question. The statute requires the concurrence of both the trial
and appellate courts. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir.
1976).
82. Askew v. United States Dist. Court, 527 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1975). Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment . ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
83. Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1968). See note 79
supra.
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the court has decided the viability of appeal. For example, venue trans-

fers are interlocutory and therefore not appealable84 absent certification
by the district judge. Denial of class action certification, particularly in
86
rule 23(b)(2) 85 actions, is appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a).

In contrast, granting class action certification is interlocutory and carries
with it a strong preference for review only after final judgment.87
The court's handling of discovery orders shows its strong preference
for remedies other than mandamus. First, the injured party must ask for a

protective order. 88 If this request is denied, he must disobey the discovery
order, receive a contempt citation, and take an appeal from the citation.89
Although the Ninth Circuit has indicated that not all contempt citations
are final and therefore appealable,' recent indications are that the mere
possibility that another remedy exists will discourage the court from
allowing mandamus.91
In situations where it is unclear whether appeal or mandamus is the

appropriate remedy, the court has permitted a party to file both an appeal
and a petition for the writ. 92 The court then determines which remedy, if
any, it will employ. Similarly, the court will convert an appeal into a
petition for mandamus. 93 Therefore, recognition by the party seeking
review that an appeal may be proper is not a complete bar to obtaining
84. Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1969); Pacific
Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1968); Gulf Research & Dev. Co.
v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1950).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). This rule provides:
[An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief. . . with
respect to the class as a whole.
86. Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1974). See note 2 supra.
87. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 895-97 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
88. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 430 F.2d 955,
956 (9th Cir. 1970).
89. Belfer v. Pence, 435 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1970).
90. Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1961). But
see Belfer v. Pence, 435 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1970) (petitioner was certain the order
would be appealable).
91. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. Hartland v. Alaska Airlines, 544 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 509 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 962 (1975).
93. Steccone v. Morse-Starrett Prods., Inc., 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951); Shapiro v.
Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950).
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the writ so long as the court can, in the first instance, determine that an
appeal is not available. 94
B.

The Petitioner Will Be Damaged or Prejudiced in a Way
Not Correctable on Appeal
Whenever review after final judgment is the only remedy available to
an injured party, the court will grant interlocutory review upon a showing
of irreparable injury. 95 The burden which the party must satisfy, "that
the harm will, in all likelihood occur, absent the writ,', 96 indicates that a
possibility of harm 97 is insufficient. 98 In seeking review of transfer
orders, for example, the inconvenience of what may be an unnecessary
trial is usually not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant mandamus.9 9 The
court is looking for damage to the petitioner that, if not corrected
immediately, will never be correctable. Recognizing that a discovery
order will result in trade secrets being irretrievably lost, the Ninth Circuit
has found immediate review necessary to protect the rights of the injured
party.100 Similarly, the threat that notice of pending actions will be sent to
94. But see Hartland v. Alaska Airlines, 544 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 509 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975). See
also notes 159-62 infra and accompanying text.
95. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 109 (1977); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court,
523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975); Kerr v. United States Dist. Coirt, 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1961).
96. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 109 (1977).
97. In Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 109 (1977) the Ninth Circuit stated: "Interference with the trial court's
control over its own proceeding is not a matter to be undertaken lightly or on the basis of
mere speculation by the parties or the reviewing court about what may occur at some
future date." Id. at 692 (emphasis added). But see Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975) where mandamus was held proper
upon a showing that there was a "threat of imminent action." Id. at 1076 (emphasis
added).
98. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 656-58 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1950) (transfer based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970)-improper venue). But see Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of
America, 408 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1969); Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949
(9th Cir. 1968). Where the transfer is based on 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1970), it is important to
recall:
The purpose of the rule is to avoid the disruption, expense and inconvenience
parties and witnesses must suffer by having the trial in an improper forum. To require
litigants to await final judgment for relief serves to defeat the very purpose of the
venue rule by requiring them to submit to the disadvantages from which the rule is
designed to relieve them.
403 F.2d at 952.
100. Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
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other potential plaintiffs' 01 is grounds for interlocutory review. Once
notice is improperly sent to potential plaintiffs, a defendant may not be
able to recover damages for the additional lawsuits that are filed against
him.12 At the very least, a showing of irreparable injury will encourage
the court to go to the merits'0 3 of the order to determine if the trial judge,

in making his determination, sufficiently considered all relevant factors. 104
C.

The DistrictCourt's Orderis ClearlyErroneousas a Matter of Law

Satisfaction of this criterion requires more than a showing that the
judge erroneously applied the law. 0 5 Since mandamus does not "run the
gauntlet of reversible error," 106 the petitioner must show that there was
no legal basis for the trial judge's decision. A petitioner must satisfy this
burden because of the circuit court's desire to refrain from substituting its
judgment for that of the trial judge. 107
Mandamus will not lie when there is a well-reasoned and substantial
legal basis for the district judge's decision. 108 However, when the judge
disregards precedent' °9 or acts "without authority sanctioned by statute,
rule, or equitable powers of the federal court," ' 110 the writ may be issued
as a proper remedy. The Ninth Circuit has granted mandamus to remedy
venue transfers that were accomplished in a manner blatantly inconsistent
with the provisions of the statute.'' Also, the writ has issued to vacate a
stay of proceedings when the order did not fit into any of the criteria
outlined by the Supreme Court. 112
101. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1975). In Pan Am, which involved a mass accident tort action originating with an airplane
crash, the judge indicated his intent to notify all other passengers of the airplane which
crashed that claims were pending before him. The judge's intention was evidenced by his
order for production of a passenger list. Petitioner sought mandamus to vacate the
production order, thereby avoiding the intended notice procedure.
102. Id. at 1076.
103. Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 1974).
104. Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969).
105. Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1950).
106. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967).
107. Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969).
108. Id. See also American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 538 F.2d
1371, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1976).
109. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820,
824 (9th Cir. 1963).
110. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1076
(9th Cir. 1975).
111. Commercial Lighting Prods., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 537 F.2d 1078 (9th
Cir. 1976) (transfer to a district where the action could not have been instituted).
112. Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Application of this criterion is further exemplified by the court's
interpretation of federal rule 23.113 The Ninth Circuit encourages innovation by the district judges in finding new methods of dealing with the
complexities of class action litigation."14 The court is equally willing,
however, to communicate its disfavor for orders that are unsupported by
the clear language of the rule.' Mandamus is the tool which allows an
appellate court to voice its disfavor in this situation.
D. The DistrictCourt's Order is an Oft-Repeated Error, or Manifests
PersistentDisregardof the FederalRules
This requirement is taken directly from the Supreme Court's decision
in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co."16 According to the Court, in order to
satisfy the requirement, the petitioner must show that the district judge
has repeatedly entered the particular order in opposition to the circuit
court's previous rulings.1 1 7 The extent to which the Ninth Circuit has had
to resort to8 this criterion in the past to justify issuance of the writ is
uncertain. "
E. The DistrictCourt's Order Raises New and Important Problems,
or Issues of Law of FirstImpression
According to the Supreme Court,' 9 this factor calls for the appellate
court to use its power of "advisory" mandamus. Since the circuit court
encourages innovation by trial judges, 120 it only intervenes when the trial
22
2
judge is innovative beyond the parameters of the law.' ' In one case,
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
114. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 109 (1977).
115. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
116. 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See notes 30-38 supra and accompanying text.
117. 352 U.S. at 258-59.
118. The Bauman court cites McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court,
523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) as exemplifying the "oft
repeated error/persistent disregard" criterion. However, it is doubtful that the "persistent
disregard" in McDonnell Douglas was the type of error that created the "extraordinary
circumstances" in La Buy. In Bauman, it was recognized that the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals "had warned its district judges against excessive use of reference to special
masters for at least 17 years before Judge LaBuy's [sic] improper reference." 557 F.2d at
660. In McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, the writ was issued on the basis of the
"persisent disregard" standard after only a single prior Ninth Circuit case rendered the
McDonnell Douglas judge's order erroneous. See La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co.,
489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973). See also notes 150-55 infra and accompanying text.
119. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
120. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1975).
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the Ninth Circuit considered what remedy is proper when the lower court
intends to erroneously order that notice be given in consolidated tort
actions. The court delineated the boundaries of the rules' 23 upon which
the district court had erroneously relied.
Through its decisions, the circuit court has indicated that this criterion
is not limited to interpreting new rules. 124 It will not, however, utilize
mandamus to speak on new interpretations of older rules or to give its
position on an area of the law over which the other circuits have split,
25
absent a showing of some additional basis for issuance of the writ.
V.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE BAUMAN CRITERIA

The Ninth Circuit, in Bauman, recognized that consideration of the
aforementioned five factors requires considerable balancing. 126 Often the
factual situation satisfying one of the standards will bear so heavily on
the need for immediate action by mandamus that the other factors lose
importance. The court is usually willing to consider the very real consequences (to the litigants) of the trial judge's order. Although Bauman
provides a warning to the circuit judges not to be influenced by their
sympathy for the petitioner's position, 2 7 there are circumstances which
have demanded this type of response.
In Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Couri, 28 the petitioner

was forced, by a discovery order, to reveal a secret ink formula. The
defendant's dye was used in the production of the ink and an alleged
defect in the dye caused the petitioner to sue for damages. The petitioner
sought mandamus to vacate the discovery order since the order would
force disclosure of a trade secret, the protection of which was more
compelling than the defendant's need for the information. Although the
court readily admitted that, in theory, the petitioner might have other
remedies, 29 such remedies might not have been available from a practical standpoint. 130 Furthermore, the court observed that, if the discovery
order in question was left unreviewed, the petitioner would incur substantial economic harm and sustain irreparable damage.' 3 ' If improper,
123. Id. at 1077-81.
124. Id. at 1078-81.
125. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1977).
126. Id. at 655.
127. Id. at 653.
128. 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
129. Id. at 329.
130. The Ninth Circuit remarked: "The weakness of [respondent's] argument is that
not all of the sanctions which the district judge might impose under Rule 37 are final and
therefore appealable." Id.
131. Id. at 329-30.
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discovery of the petitioner's trade secrets would result in such a "grave
miscarriage of justice" 1 32 that the court felt compelled to review the
propriety of the district court's order. Upon review, it was determined
that the equities
weighed heavily in favor of the writ and the court acted
133
accordingly.
Similarly, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States
District Court,134 tl". trial judge had threatened to send notice to potential
plaintiffs of the actions pending before him stemming from the same
incident. The Ninth Circuit found that the potential 3 ' damage to the
136
petitioner, coupled with the lack of a legal basis for the judge's order,
was sufficient to warrant mandamus without consideration of other factors (i. e., the availability of appeal). Since the harm to the petitioner
was substantial, the court scrutinized the legal basis for the order. The
13 8
district court found support for its order in various procedural rules.
The circuit court found that none of these rules authorized the action
taken by the district judge. The dissent points out, however, that the
circuit court had previously affirmed application of procedural rules that
were based on "loose" readings so long as there was no express prohibition against such application stated in the rule. 139 The decision to issue
the writ was based on the unfair position imposed upon the petitioner.
Although the court had previously indicated that misapplication or
misinterpretation of the law by the trial judge is not "error as a matter of
law," 140 such misapplication was held sufficient to warrant mandamus in
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.141 The trial judge in Green had
erroneously found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for main132. Id. at 328.
133. The court vacated the discovery order, without prejudice, leaving it to the respondent to satisfy his burden that the information sought was relevant and necessary to
his defense. Id. at 331-32.
134. 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975). See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
135. The court observed that the district judge had not yet ordered notice to the
potential plaintiffs, but notice was "implicit in [the court's] denial of the motions of
McDonnell Douglas." 523 F.2d at 1076, 1081.
136. Id. at 1076-78.
137. Id. at 1076.
138. In addition to basing its order on the general equitable powers of the federal
courts, the district court also found that various federal rules applied: rule 16 (concerning
pretrial conferences); rule 19 (joinder); rule 83 (promulgation of court rules); rule 23 (class
actions); rule 21 (joinder of parties); and rule 42 (consolidation of issues). The circuit court
rejected all of these bases of support for the notice procedure. 523 F.2d at 1077-81.
139. 523 F.2d at 1082.
140. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
141. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
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tenance of a valid class action under rule 23(b)(1)

42

and (b)(3).

143

Admitting that the decision to grant class action certification was not
appealable until final judgment'" because such decisions usually do not
cause serious harm, the court issued the writ. It was noted that in
situations which resulted in certification under (b)(1) and (b)(3), the
(b)(1) classification would predominate, 45 thereby eliminating the notice
requirements of a (b)(3) action." Framing its decision in terms of error
as a matter of law, 4 7 the court was influenced enough by the harm to the
petitioner that would occur, to raise the level of error to the requisite
standard. The decision, on its face, however, discusses nothing more
serious than the judicial error that occurred through misapplication of the
rule 23(b)(1) requirements to the facts of the case.
At times the court apparently feels so compelled to issue a writ of
mandamus that clear standards are applied with questionable accuracy.
The Supreme Court in La Buy concluded that "repeated error" satisfied
the "extraordinary circumstances" test. 148 Meeting the standard requires
a showing of repeated error by the particular judge, and that he had been
previously reversed for commiting the same error.149 Flagrant and persistent disregard of precedent by the inferior courts would be sufficient to
warrant issuance of the writ.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The rule provides that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class ....
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This rule states that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
144. 541 F.2d at 1338-39.
145. Id. at 1340.
146. Id. at 1339-40.Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (notice
required in rule 23(b)(3) class action).
147. Id.
148. 352 U.S. at 258-59.
149. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit felt that it found this type of disregard in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court. 5 ' McDonnell Douglas
involved a group of tort claims that arose from an airplane crash. The
district judge had certified the action as a class action and the Ninth
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus to vacate the class certification order.
The court based its decision that repeated error had been committed on:151
a
similar order issued by the same district judge in a prior case (Gabel);
an opinion one year later by the circuit court (La Mar);52 and the
"repeated error" committed in McDonnell Douglas.'53 The conclusion
was faulty because: the first district court order (in Gabel) was not
clearly erroneous at the time it was issued because the La Mar case had
not yet been decided; there was uncertainty as to whether Gabel was
actually overruled by La Mar;154 and the La Mar decision addressed
itself to a different district judge. The language in McDonnell Douglas,
referring to "repeated errors of this magnitude,"' 155 indicates that there
was misapplication of the La Buy test. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit is
requiring a stricter standard for its district judges than the standard
furnished by the Supreme Court. By accepting a single repetition of the
error as satisfaction of this requirement, the court seems to be guided
more by a sense of justice than by the legal guidelines enunciated in La
Buy.
Considering the court's willingness to find that the La Buy test was
satisfied in McDonnell Douglas, and that the clear error standard was
met in Green, the Ninth Circuit's refusal to make similar findings in
Bauman is curious. 156 The circuit court has not clearly determined when
150. 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
151. In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
152. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
153. 523 F.2d at 1087.
154. Gabel, like McDonnell Douglas, involved a mass accident tort claim resulting
from an airplane crash. La Mar was based on alleged overcharges of loan interest and
airline rates. La Mar did not address itself to the situation in Gabel or McDonnell
Douglas. Rather, La Mar broadly discussed class actions and required subsequent opinions to indicate its applicability to mass accident claims.
155. 523 F.2d at 1087.
156. The petitioner in Bauman was seeking mandamus to correct an order that she felt
would erroneously apply opt-out procedures to rule 23(b)(2) class actions. The court
stated that, as of that time, it had issued no opinion regarding this issue. Two years before
Bauman, the circuit's position was expressed in Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, slip
op. at 14 n. I1 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975) (vacated and replaced by 1977 decision) indicating that
members in a rule 23(b)(2) action may not opt-out. On the day that Bauman was decided,
the court reiterated the same proposition in Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1229 n. 14
(9th Cir. 1977) but declined to apply it in Bauman. 557 F.2d at 659, 661-62. Had the court
done so, the trial judge's order in Bauman may well have been, according to the circuit's
standards, both erroneous as a matter of law and in disregard of the federal rules.

1978]

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

there is sufficient precedent to make a trial judge's ruling either erroneous as a matter of law or oft-repeated error. Perhaps the personal nature
of mandamus and the emotions of the appellate judges are more significant factors than has been stated.
Admittedly, Bauman contains a compilation of factors which have
been expressed in earlier opinions."5 7 These factors seem to fall aside,
however, when the writ is sought to correct actions such as the "traditional usurpation of power." 1" 8 The court in Hartland v. Alaska Airlines159 purposely declined to rule on the appealability of the judicial
order in question.160 Hartlandinvolved a pre-settlement contribution to a
discovery fund. The fund was applicable only to parties who had signed
the stipulation creating it. The judge in Hartlandordered the petitioner to
contribute, even though the petitioner was not a party to the stipulation
and had not filed a claim in any court. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it
was proper to issue the writ, 161 even though the petitioner failed to satisfy
a primary burden-that no other remedy existed. The court glossed over
this issue with surprising ease. It appears that there could be few, if any,
factors that could outweigh the petitioner's need to show that he had no
other available remedy. This requirement was devised in order to preserve the extraordinary nature of mandamus. A possible explanation lies
in the recognition that the use of mandamus to remedy errors affecting
jurisdiction and power was established long before the courts attempted
to delineate any specific guidelines. 162 The correction of jurisdictional
errors by use of the writ has survived the recent judicial attempt, in
Bauman, to provide a workable framework.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The specific applications hereinabove discussed illustrate that the
Ninth Circuit's concepts of equity and procedural flexibility play a key
role in its decisions. By examining the facts in each case, the court
assesses, with an eye towards equity, the serious harm to the petitioner
that will inevitably occur absent the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The
greater the degree of harm, the more willing the court is to overlook the
impact of the other factors. Also, while encouraging trial judges to use
innovative procedural methods, the appellate court is primarily guided by
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See 557 F.2d at 654.
See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
544 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002.
See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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its own concept of the scope of lower court discretion. When lower
courts pass the threshold of acceptable legal interpretation, mandamus
becomes the appropriate device to monitor trial judges.
The aforementioned considerations underscore the guidelines that the
court has enumerated in cases like Bauman and its predecessors. Articulated as attempts to develop a workable framework, 63 these
guidelines are more realistically retrospective justifications of the court's
decisions. When confronted with an appropriate factual situation, the
court seems willing to react in disregard of its own guidelines. It then
fashions its opinion by varying the emphasis it gives to each of the
factors.
Lisa B. Lench

163. 557 F.2d at 654.

